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FORUM
A FALSE SENSE OF SOCIAL
REALITY: A RESPONSE TO
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY
RIcaARn A. EPsman4*
Professor Chemerinsky's and my original remarks are like two
ships passing in the night.1 I advanced a series of theoretical and
empirical arguments to indicate that all people would be better off
with competitive markets and the repeal of the antidiscrimination
laws. He in turn bypasses my initial points and develops indepen-
dently the reasons why he believes that the enforcement of the
employment discrimination laws remains necessary. The course he
charts is one commonly traveled, so I will risk collision by responding
to his points in the order he has made them.
The first step in his argument is to claim that without the antidis-
crimination laws harmful employment discrimination would exist in
the American market system.2 Historically, he notes there were illus-
trations of discrimination against women and Jews in the years before
1964. And I dare say that such forms of discrimination still exist
today. But he does not explain how it is that antidiscrimination laws
change these deep-seated attitudes (if they are deep-seated) for the
better. Nor does he give any account of the economic significance of
the discrimination that he observed. The refusal of many mainline
firms to hire Jewish lawyers led to the rise of predominantly Jewish
firms. And the continued persistence of Jewish and non-Jewish firms
today suggests that there are some organizational gains from a system
which has both free entry and some levels of religious separation,
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
1. See Richard A. Epstein & Erwin Chemerinsky, Should Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 Be Repealed?, 2 S. CAt.. IbNiwsc. L. 349 (1993).
2. Id. at 357.
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even in commercial settings. In order for Chemerinsky's indictment
to be credible, he would have to show that the wages of Jewish law-
yers were lower than that of their rivals; or that their scope of oppor-
tunity was smaller; or that firms that cross cultural and national and
religious lines have not been formed. He presents no evidence on any
of these points.
The treatment of women in the legal profession raises somewhat
different issues. For a whole variety of cultural reasons, women did
not participate in the legal profession in large numbers before 1964,
and there was doubtless some very considerable reluctance on the
part of firms to hire the few women who were on the market. But
here too it is evident that cultural attitudes were changing very rapidly
through the 1950s and 1960s. I can redall that while women in law
school were rare when I was a law student at Yale Law School from
1966 to 1968, the entire set of attitudes changed by 1970. I can recall,
for example, in a discussion of the issue at USC in 1970 or 1971 that
the late Judge Robert Kingsley mused aloud in a speech to USC law
students that he would not hire any woman as his law clerk. Eye-
brows were raised, but nothing was said. That attitude has largely dis-
appeared, and I know of no litigation that spurred on the fundamental
change outlook. Here is a case where the social expectations moved
in parallel with the statutes. I doubt that the basic situation would be
much different today even if the statute were never on the books.
And I am quite sure that any effort to place a sex discrimination stat-
ute on the books when Sandra Day O'Connor graduated from Stan-
ford Law School would have been a complete failure. The great
advantage of the market is that it allows a minority to experiment
when the majority is reluctant to do so-a point of great practical and
theoretical importance. Title VII has had little if anything to do with
the changes in the role of women in the legal marketplace. The basic
economic forces and technological changes have pushed aside all
resistance.
Professor Chemerinsky's second point is that "prejudice distorts
employers' evaluation of employees."3 To his mind employers are a
unitary class of individuals who cannot appreciate the skills that
blacks, women, Jews, gays and lesbians bring to society. But again
one asks for evidence to support the position. Jews and Asians have
the highest income levels of any racial group. The income of gays and
3. Id.
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lesbians, and their educational level, are well above the national aver-
ages. The income of blacks, while lower than that of whites, shows a
very different picture when adjusted for education and experience. If
one looked at blacks and whites of equal income, I would be stunned
if they had equal education and experiential qualifications, so strong is
the influence of affirmative action, which Professor Chemerinsky
seems to regard as unrelated to the basic operation of employment
markets. In Forbidden Grounds, I did say that all the institutional dis-
crimination that I have witnessed has been in favor of members of
protected groups. 4 Professor Chemerinsky says this is "obviously not
true."5 Apparently, he has never read the affirmative action guide-
lines for federal contractors or for accredited law schools, or the
advertisements in the Chronicle of Higher Education.
In addition, Professor Chemerinsky fails to note how the aggres-
sive use of Title VII makes it more difficult for employers to make
meritocratic decisions. When standardized tests were first introduced,
they were thought to serve as an antidote to the subjective impres-
sions that employers might form of employees, and teachers of their
students. But now these tests must meet often-impossible standards
of verification before they can be used to screen prospective employ-
ees or evaluate existing ones. The reduced availability of tests forces
employers to return again to their background estimates of the pro-
ductive abilities of various groups. Thus Title VII deprives the market
of the information that is needed to counter prejudice, and encourages
covert reliance on the very stereotypes that Professor Chemerinsky
deplores.
Professor Chemerinsky believes that markets also fail because
perceived customer preferences will lead employers to ignore the abili-
ties of their employees. His first mistake is to assume that all these
customer preferences line up in the same fashion. Yet if men prefer
male urologists, today women increasingly prefer to have female
obstetricians. And in huge markets, such as health care generally,
women are the dominant purchasers of services for the entire family.
Matters of race are scarcely different. His vision of a monolithic set of
employment preferences treats the diversity movement as though it
had no influence on the patterns of employment, when it is not only
4. RicHARD A. EpsmN, FORBmDEN GROuns: Tim CASE AGAiNsr EMPLOYMEIr Dis-
cmImWATON LAws 503 (1992).
5. See Epstein & Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 358.
[Vol. 3:445 1993]
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the Clinton Administration that has imposed rigid racial and sex pref-
erences in employment. While these practices are perfectly permissi-
ble for a private employer, they are wholly inappropriate for any
government body. And in the midst of his lament, he might have
taken note of the fact that for blue-collar workers male wages have
dipped during the last decade, without there being any increase in
female or minority wages over the same time period. The data sup-
port my general conclusion that the civil rights movement produces
allocative losses, without generating any distributional gain to the cur-
rent roster of protected classes.
Fourth, Professor Chemerinsky thinks that labor markets are so
rigidly separated that Koreans will have to look to Koreans for jobs;
blacks to blacks and so on. I do not know where he has obtained this
vision of American labor markets as a form of South African
apartheid or whether he has again failed to understand the powerful
role that diversity plays as a business issue in businesses across the
land. His own statement of "pervasive discrimination by the white
community against these [minority] groups"6 is not an empirical
observation, but a false declaration of faith.
Fifth, Professor Chemerinsky argues that the problem of sexual
harassment is proof positive that employers do not care about sexual
harassmentZ But here too hisposition is not credible when measured
against the evidence. The obvious point is that an employer does not
wish to be held vicariously liable for the losses when one employee
harasses another. Who can blame them for that? The enormous cot-
tage industry that has arisen in the past half-dozen years in fashioning
firm guidelines should not be taken as a sign of employer indifference
on the issue. It is rather the hope that other devices less divisive and
less expensive than litigation can be used to deal with the problem.
Professor Chemerinsky's other arguments fare no better than his
initial salvo. In particular he thinks that I am wholly insensitive to the
costs that discrimination places on employees who are subject to it.
No one wants to deny that these costs exist (just as they exist with
affirmative action programs as well). But again it is important to note
the consequences of any individual rejection. Chemerinsky acts as
though the disappointed applicant is shut out of the labor market alto-
gether. He never asks whether the overall effect of the antidis-
crimination law is to reduce the total number of opportunities; reduce
6. Ia
7. Id-
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the level of real wages; reduce the levels of employee mobility; and
reduce the total number of jobs that the economy is able to generate.
It is his policy on race that has been in effect for the past thirty years.
Whey then attribute the massive malaise that has led to the Rodney
King riots to a set of policies that would increase the overall job
opportunities for blacks? When he laments the large number of
uncounted people who have given up the search for jobs, he should
remember that the antidiscrimination laws, like the minimum wage
laws, constitute a legal barrier to entry that hurts the very persons he
wants to help.
If his economic arguments will not wash, neither will Professor
Chemerinsky's appeal to intuitive sense of fairness. To the extent that
appeals of this sort have merit, they can be made to individual
employers, many of whom will respond to their intrinsic force by
altering their own hiring policies. But even if they do not, where is the
offense against equality? This is not a situation where women and
minorities are barred by law from entering the labor market. They
can offer their services to anyone just the same as white men; they can
seek to become employers just the same as white men. The issue is
not equality, which open markets have in abundance. The question is
whether an antidiscrimination law is worth the enormous systematic
costs that it imposes on a market. Perhaps Professor Chemerinsky
thinks that he can beat a competitive labor market with an expanded
version of the Federal Register. But if so, he gives us no sense as to
how.
Professor Chemerinsky is not only wrong in his assessment of the
antidiscrimination laws but he woefully misunderstands the economic
logic behind the principle of freedom of contract. The reason that the
social presumption is set in its favor is that voluntary trade generates
mutual gains for the parties. But this presumption is only a presump-
tion, not a mindless absolute. The reason we do not allow the free
sale of lead gasoline is because of its negative effects on third parties,
effects that are not taken into account by either the firm that sells or
the ordinary citizen who buys gasoline. There is no freedom of con-
tract to commit a tort. But there are no similar third-party effects that
an antidiscrimination law must address. To the contrary, even though
the statute places its legal obligations solely on the employer, the
restrictions that the statute requires are felt both by employers and
employees. If the employer cannot pay the black worker a lower
wage than the white worker, then the black worker cannot offer to
[Vol. 3:445 1993]
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work for that lower wage in order to gain the first needed step in the
labor market. To assert that I would "expand the protection of free-
dom of contract for businesses at the expense of decreasing freedom
of contract for individuals"8 is to treat freedom of contract as a nega-
tive or zero-sum game for the parties-employers will only prosper if
employees lose. But that misconception overlooks the basic point that
whatever its form, the employment discrimination laws restrict free-
dom for all parties. And that restriction is only justifiable by showing
some social gain that markets could not achieve. Professor Chemerin-
sky identifies none.
Professor Chemerinsky writes as though he can show that gain by
showing the success of the antidiscrimination laws. Success there
surely is in one sense. There are lots of changes that can be attributed
to the antidiscrimination laws. But there are not lots of improvements
that can be attributable to them. Thus it is quite true that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act9 works a chilling end to
mandatory retirement. Here the ability of the Congress to implement
this statute was never in doubt, for it is a simple matter to expunge all
contractual provisions that require employers to retire at seventy or
any other age. But what reasons are there to believe that this massive
change helps employment markets. It has created major problems in
dealing with employee pensions. It will reduce the mobility of labor.
It will prevent the advancement of younger persons through the ranks.
It will make businesses less able to compete in international markets.
It will give over-seventy people full salary and full pension while those
far younger than them must get along on far less when their family
needs are far greater. In our own line of business-universities-it
will lead to increased costs, curricular ossification and reduced educa-
tional innovation, points to which Congress and the civil rights move-
ment are wholly oblivious. The costs of this misguided bit of
Congressional mischief are evident to those who care to inquire. The
net social benefits of overriding contracts that all persons, rich and
poor, in all occupations have agreed to is nowhere demonstrated by
Professor Chemerinsky or anyone else.
Nor does Professor Chemerinsky solve matters by referring to the
flawed studies of Professor Blumrosen on the impact of the civil rights
8. Id. at 360.
9. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1982)).
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acts.10 Initially it is a mistake to assume that all the shifts in occupa-
tional patterns post-1964 are attributable to the Civil Rights Act,
given the persistent increases in black wages during the 1946-1964
period. And in any event the Blumrosen study has rightly been
faulted by Professor James Heckman on the ground that it looks only
at gross occupational categories and ignores the variations in wage
data for individual workers within categories.11 When that closer
examination is made, then there is no evidence that the wage gap
between black and white has narrowed after 1975, notwithstanding
the enormous public resources that have been devoted to the enforce-
ment of the employment discrimination laws. Since black unemploy-
ment levels have risen as well, why then celebrate the good intentions
of the civil rights laws when they do not have consequences to match?
The same can be said about sex discrimination as well. Why is
there some great social advance in prohibiting airlines from choosing
employees who meet the demands of their passengers? The steward-
esses who are able to keep their jobs after they reach age thirty-two,
or after they become pregnant, might rejoice in the decision. But
what of the younger women who want these positions but are unable
to obtain them? Likewise when airlines are forced to hire men as
stewards, some women will miss out on jobs as well. At best it
appears that Professor Chemerinsky favors a set of costly administra-
tive changes that give one person a job when the employer prefers to
hire someone else. In truth, it is unlikely that there will be a one-for-
one trade-off. If the airlines had been left to their own devices, then
the total number of positions would have increased as well. Here too
Professor Chemerinsky has shown that there has been coerced
change, but he has not shown any improvement.
But what if we look at the broader wage data. It again shows how
little good has come of the antidiscrimination laws. Ironically the
wage differential between men and women in 1984 was just the same
as it had been in 1955, before the civil rights acts went on the books:
63.9% in 1955 and 63.7% in 1984.12 White women did not regain their
1955 wage levels with white men until 1987. A lot of explanations
10. Alfred W. Blumrosen, Society in Transition I A Broader Congressional Agenda for
Equal Employment-The Peace Dividend, Leapfrogging, and Other Matters, 8 YAI.E L. & PoL'y
REv. 257 (1990).
11. See lames J. Heckman & . Hoult Verkerke, Racial Disparity and Employment Dis-
crimination Laws: An Economic Perspective, 8 YALE L. & PoL'y RE v. 276 (1990).
12. CLAtiA GoLDw, UNDm rAmN1G THE Gnm'rw GAP: AN EcoNoMwc HI TORY OF
AxmmcAN Wom-N 60.61 (1990).
[Vol. 3:445 1993]
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may be offered for this finding. The increased number of women
entering into the market may have reduced the productivity of the
average worker, so that the decline in average wages could be a reflec-
tion of changes in the composition of the workforce. Or there could
have been a shift in the kinds of work demanded, with greater demand
for some technical skills possessed in greater abundance by men. I am
not committed to any of these explanations, and have offered various
observations on the issue myself.' But whatever the precise explana-
tion, no one can find in Title VII an engine of social progress. The
statute has imposed a regulatory drag which has probably hurt men
more than women in the relative wage derby, but which has helped
neither group at all.
Professor Chemerinsky's final remarks leave the realm of the
economic to enter the realm of the symbolic. He foresees a disaster
from the total repeal of the social antidiscrimination laws. He
believes that the government, by allowing people to be free to hire
and fire by contract, is "implicitly saying racism, sexism, and
homophobia are acceptable in this society."14 But the government
says nothing of the sort, expressly or impliedly. What it says with
repeal is that all persons have the right to pick the persons with whom
they associate in private transactions, and that they alone are respon-
sible for the choices that they make. This freedom of choice is
allowed to all citizens, not just to a preferred few, and the only
message that is stated impliedly is that we think that all citizens are
able enough to fend for themselves so that we do not have to rely on
an employment policy that explicitly protects some individuals while
prejudicing others. I fail to see the social disaster that would follow
once the true information about the effects of these statutes was made
evident to the general public. Our civil rights policies have been no
more successful than other programs of government central planning
and control. It is time that we took government out of labor markets,
where it has caused so much economic mischief and has done so little
symbolic good.
13. Richard A. Epstein, Some Reflections on the Gender Gap in Employment, 82 GEo. W.
75 (1993).
14. See Epstein & Chemerinsky, supra note 1, at 361.
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